Abstract: We propose a high-dimensional quantum key distribution protocol secure against photon-number splitting attack by employing only one or two decoy states. Decoy states dramatically increase the protocol's secure distance.
Introduction
High-dimensional quantum key distribution (HD-QKD) allows two parties to generate multiple secure bits of information per detected photon. HD-QKD protocols employing time-energy entanglement are particularly attractive because the photon correlations are robust in both free-space and fiber-based transmissions. However, these protocols are vulnerable to Eve's photon-number splitting (PNS) attack whenever they use an imperfect single photon source with finite probabilities of multiphoton emissions. In the PNS attack, Eve measures the photon number of each transmission and selectively splits multiphoton signals-keeping one copy to herself and sending the other copy to Bob.
The decoy state protocol is designed to detect the PNS attack. The central idea is to test the channel transmission properties by varying the source intensity. Previous analysis of decoy state protocol for an HD-QKD system has only considered an infinite number of decoy states [1] , which is practically impossible to achieve. We report the first analysis of the security of HD-QKD protocols employing a practical number of decoy states [2] . Our results answer the important question of how many decoy states are necessary for a practical-yet secure-implementation of HD-QKD.
Decoy State Protocol
In time-energy entangled HD-QKD, entangled photon pairs are produced by a spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC) source held by Alice. Alice retains one photon and sends Bob the other one. Alice and Bob randomly choose to measure their photons in the conjugate bases of photon arrival time and photon frequency. If both parties measure in the same basis, their measurements will be correlated. Similar correlations can be achieved in the prepareand-measure scheme, where Alice prepares photons in one of the two conjugate bases using an attenuated laser source.
To perform the decoy state protocol, Alice and Bob choose a signal state intensity with an expected photon-pair number μ and two decoy state intensities with expected photon-pair numbers ν 1 and ν 2 . Alice and Bob can then bound the amount of information lost to Eve by estimating, at the different intensity settings, the probability of registering one or more detections as well as the correlations between their measurements. The secure-key capacity, in terms of bits per detected coincidence (bpc), in the regime of infinitely long key is
where β is the reconciliation efficienty and I(A; B) is the mutual information between Alice and Bob. χ is the amount of information assumed to be lost to Eve, defined as
Here, F μ is the fraction of signal state frames in which Alice and Bob measure a detection, given that the source emits single photons. n R is the number of random bits shared between Alice and Bob when they use an error-correcting code employing an average of n ECC bits, revealed over the public channel. χ UB ξ t ,ξ ω (A; E) is an upper bound on Eve's Holevo information, given an estimate of ξ t and ξ ω which parameterize the decrease in timing and frequency correlations, respectively. Figure 1 plots the secure-key capacity of decoy-state HD-QKD with a source with mean photon numbers per frame μ = 0.01, 0.10, and 0.25. We see that HD-QKD with two decoy states can generate multiple secure bits per coincidence at distances over 200 km and at rates similar to those achieved by a protocol with infinite decoy states. Furthermore, HD-QKD with only one decoy state is practical at short distances, where it is almost as secure as a protocol with two decoy states. HD-QKD with only one or two decoy states can therefore be implemented to optimize the rate of secure quantum communications.
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Experimental Proposal
Our analysis is general and can be applied to any HD-QKD protocol utilizing time-energy entanglement. One possible implementation is the dispersive-optics QKD, where Alice and Bob detect their photons either directly or after normal/anomalous group velocity dispersion [3] . Their dispersed measurements are correlated if Alice applies normal dispersion and Bob applies anomalous dispersion of equal magnitude. Integrated photonic circuit implementation of DO-QKD with decoy states is possible with recent developments of on-chip dispersion control [4] . Decoy-state intensity modulation in an on-chip DO-QKD can be performed by tuning the ring-resonator coupling.
